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Reviewed by Kelly Sorensen, Ursinus College 
 
 
Public reason liberalism -- the form of liberalism defended by Rawls, Larmore, 
Audi, Gaus, Rorty, Nussbaum, and to some degree Habermas -- usually requires citizens to 
publicly discuss and vote based on only those reasons that pass some sort of test that sifts away 
religious and comprehensive non-religious reasons. In the public sphere, those with such views 
are required by the role of citizenship to shape up or shut up -- "shape up" in the sense of 
offering instead reasons that can or could be shared by all other citizens. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff argues that public reason liberalism is a dead end, and defends instead what he takes 
to be a more defensible form of liberalism ("equal political voice liberalism"). His book is fresh 
and compelling, and an important contribution to political philosophy. 
 
This is a collection of mostly new essays: nine appear for the first time. The remaining 
six are lightly edited for coherence with the new material. Ten concern public reason liberalism. 
The rest take up the nature of rights (extending the account that Wolterstorff has been developing 
in his recent books Justice: Rights and Wrongs and Justice in Love), the nature and source of 
citizens' political obligations to the state, and other issues in political philosophy. 
 
What motivates public reason liberalism's restrictions on the reasons citizens can express and 
vote on? One factor is fairness, a second pluralism, and a third a certain kind of realism about 
pluralism's persistence. Rawls says that we can expect "a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, 
including both religious and nonreligious doctrines . . . as the natural outcome of the activities of 
human reason under enduring free institutions". This pluralism is "not seen as a disaster" 
(Political Liberalism (PL), xxiv), but it does raise concerns regarding a fourth factor, the stability 
of a liberal polity over time. Public reason liberalism sees religious comprehensive views in 
particular as "not admitting of compromise" and "expansionist" (Rawls), and even "conversation-
stopping" and "dangerous" (Rorty). Because of these factors, public reason liberalism says, when 
it comes to publicly advocating for coercive legislation and voting, a citizen should restrict 
herself to reasons that she believes all capable adult fellow citizens do endorse or would endorse 
if they were (variously) better informed, more rational, drawing on a shared fund of premises 
that are freestanding and neutral with respect to controversial elements of comprehensive views, 
and so on. 
 
Among Wolterstorff's arguments against public reason liberalism are the following. First, public 
reason liberalism actually is not realistic enough. One's capable adult fellow citizens clearly do 
not universally endorse the same reasons. So public reason liberalism has to idealize -- it has to 
imagine what reasons capable adult fellow citizens would endorse if they met certain 
hypothetical conditions, with the presumption that a consensus or convergence about these 
reasons would emerge. The hypothetical conditions vary from one brand of public reason 
liberalism to another. Suppose the conditions are full information and full rationality. 
Realistically, why think public reason liberalism is in a position to confidently say what reasons 
emerge from that idealization, and to say that there would be a consensus about them? Why think 
disagreement about these reasons will disappear under idealization? We can ask the same of 
Rawlsian idealization, which is laxer but still unrealistically strong: why think there would be 
consensus about what processes -- processes of rationally arriving at a set of judgments -- are 
themselves reasonable? So public reason liberalism is not realistic enough: we are stuck with 
pluralism, and we cannot idealize our way out of it. 
 
Second, public reason liberalism is paternalistic and patronizing, despite its lip service to respect. 
Suppose Jones favors some policy on religious reasons that do not qualify as public reasons. 
Smith, a fan of public reason liberalism, is stuck with telling Jones, "You shouldn't express your 
reasons in public discussion, and you shouldn't vote on them. Here instead are the kinds of 
reasons that count -- reasons you would endorse if you were not under-informed and rationally 
impaired." Jones will of course find this condescending and patronizing. Even if Smith chooses 
more diplomatic words, public reason liberalism still entails a paternalistic and patronizing view 
of Jones. It's no surprise if Jones resents such an entailment about his reasons and whether he 
should express them and vote on them, and that resentment is a problem for the stability that 
Smith and public reason liberals ostensibly treasure. 
 
A third argument from Wolterstorff is that public reason liberalism cannot consistently get what 
it wants anyway. Suppose Jones has a religious conviction that he should base his political 
views on his religious convictions. Jones listens to the arguments and objections of others with 
different views, but is unconvinced. He is like a Kantian listening to consequentialist arguments: 
he refuses to think that way. On the one hand, public reason liberals might seem to tell Jones to 
refrain from public discussion and voting. But on the other hand, that is "not what they should 
say, given their position as a whole" (100). Public reason liberalism gives citizens a prima 
facie duty to restrict themselves to public reasons, but in Jones's case that duty is outweighed by 
what he takes to be an "ultima facie" duty to appeal to his religious reasons. Public reason 
liberals will have to accept that Jones should reject their "public reason imperative." So public 
reason liberalism seems to leave Jones free to publicly debate and to vote based on his religious 
convictions after all  -- the very result that most public reason liberals were attempting to avoid! 
So it is not possible for public reason liberals, on their own terms, to declare religious reasons 
inappropriate for public political discourse. There is a tension internal to the theory here. 
 
A related fourth argument concludes that public reason liberalism asks too much of some 
religious believers. It entails that a piece of coercive legislation's legitimacy depends on Jones 
having, or counterfactually having, reasons in favor of the legislation that are good and decisive 
for Jones, the coerced subject. For at least some public reason liberals, it is not enough that 
Jones knows of public reasons that support the same legislation as his religious reasons; rather, 
the public reasons must be those on the basis of which Jones actually speaks and votes (36, 80, 
and 282). But this asks too much, Wolterstorff says. It asks Jones to let non-religious reasons 
trump his religious reasons when he speaks publicly and goes to the polls. 
 
Fifth, public reason liberalism may caricature religious believers, insofar as it implies that 
believers are unwilling to go beyond the claim that "God told me that it's wrong so it's wrong." 
Interestingly, Wolterstorff turns here to qualitative empirical data. In the public discussion in 
Oregon in the 1990s about a physician-assisted suicide initiative, a leading account reports no 
such appeals by religious believers. Instead, public discussion in Oregon was characterized by a 
plurality of more substantive and contentful religious reasons, and also importantly, a plurality of 
secular reasons (not the supposed universal counterfactual shared premises that public reason 
liberalism inevitably resorts to). 
 
Sixth, public reason liberalism may also caricature other varieties of liberal democratic 
engagement. Suppose we turn for a moment from policy deliberation and decision, the favored 
turf of public reason liberalism, to real-world grassroots organizing. In Maywood, California, 
city council members instituted an unusually onerous penalty for car drivers without a license: 
$1200 and a 30-day impound for the car. Towing companies were large donors to the city 
councilors' campaign funds. The law hit undocumented workers especially hard. Community 
members and community organizers attempted to use reasons -- public reasons -- to persuade the 
city council to change the law. That failed. Public reason liberalism seems stuck with the view 
that people in Maywood at that point should have backed off and shut up. Instead, acting under a 
plurality of reasons and emotions, including moral outrage, they ran a media campaign to call 
attention to the city council's corruption, and they registered more voters, until finally the city 
council members were voted out of office. Public reason liberalism is ill-equipped to theorize 
about real, non-well-ordered societies like, usually, our own. 
 
These are only brief samples of Wolterstorff's arguments. He offers more sophisticated and 
detailed versions of these and other arguments when he engages with the specifics of individual 
theories of Rawls, Rorty, Gaus, Audi, Habermas, and others. 
 
Wolterstorff calls his alternative form of liberal democracy "equal political voice liberalism," and 
he thinks it better accounts for the "governing idea" found in the longer historical tradition of 
liberalism, before public reason liberalism seized the spotlight in recent decades. There are two 
key aspects of equal political voice liberalism. First, citizens speak and vote within a 
constitutional context -- a context of classic civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of 
religious exercise, and freedom of association. Certain fundamental changes in law are 
appropriately "off the table" in this context of constitutional limits. Second, citizens are to speak 
and vote with an equal political voice. Intimidation and bullying are out; but otherwise, 
Wolterstorff's view puts no restrictions on the kinds of reasons to which citizens can appeal in 
public discussion and voting. That's it: we talk, using whatever reasons we want, religious and 
non-religious, comprehensive or otherwise, and then we vote. Anyone who wants to persuade 
others will, as a practical matter, find herself quoting reasons that will appeal to her opponents; 
but there is no requirement that she restrict herself to some special set of reasons. After the vote, 
there will be winners and losers. The losers will experience the winners' legislation as coercive. 
But to have expected otherwise is utopian. And Wolterstorff claims to have uncovered a variety 
of ways that public reason liberalism leans toward the utopian, despite its putative acceptance of 
pluralism, realism, and worries about stability. 
 
As to the six issues above, Wolterstorff claims that equal political voice liberalism comes off 
better. First, it makes no unrealistic claim that, counterfactually, citizens' views on legislation 
would match some imagined consensus or convergence. Second, it is more respectful and less 
patronizing to citizens, because it does not tell them that their own reasons 
are epistemically inadequate. Third, it lets citizens speak and act on their own reasons without 
internal tension in the theory; and fourth, it does not demand that alien reasons be substituted and 
decisive. Fifth, the view does not caricature the reasons that people with comprehensive views 
tend to offer. Sixth, it is not myopic about varieties of democratic engagement -- there is policy 
deliberation and decision, but there is also broad-based organizing, movement organizing, and 
protest. Equal political voice liberalism better accounts for what happened in Oregon and in 
Maywood. 
 
Wolterstorff's equal political voice liberalism does issue some "shape up" talk of its own. While 
designed to make broader room for religious reasons in the public square, it is not compatible 
with every religious perspective. Wolterstorff's liberalism does ask thinkers like Egyptian 
scholar Sayyid Qutb to endorse the constitutional context of liberal democracy and its 
commitment to not favoring any particular religious tradition. For Wolterstorff, "to affirm the 
liberal democratic polity is to put the shape of our life together at the mercy of votes in which the 
infidel has an equal voice with the believer" (295). 
 
A mood of non-utopianism hangs over the book, but Wolterstorff is neither resigned nor 
pessimistic. Unlike dour critics such as MacIntyre, he loves liberal democracy. He agrees with 
public reason liberals that pluralism is ineradicable, but claims that there is more respect, more 
stability, and more positive endorsement of the system, when citizens speak and vote with an 
equal voice in a context of fundamental constitutional limits. 
 
Equal political voice liberalism seems straightforward and simple, and it certainly has many 
attractions. Wolterstorff not only puts public reason liberals on the hot seat, but also sketches an 
alternative that captures important planks of the liberal democratic tradition. But consider a few 
concerns. 
 
First, equal political voice liberalism seems to assume that after discussing and voting and 
grassroots organizing, there will be winners and losers, but that often enough the winners will be 
losers on other matters and the losers will in turn be winners (294). I take it this claim is 
supposed to address familiar concerns about stability. But it would be utopian to think that this 
happens often enough. It is easy to imagine places where the losers are very often repeat losers, 
because a majority persists there that sees little need to engage minority interlocutors. Depending 
on the place, the repeat losers could either be secular minorities or religious minorities.  
Wolterstorff will claim otherwise, but the best form of public reason liberalism might have more 
resources to address this worry than equal political voice liberalism. 
 
Second, the book does not make clear whether Wolterstorff would consider an issue like state-
authorized gay marriage to be part of the constitutional context, properly understood, and so part 
of the basic civil liberties that are "off the table" for democratic alteration by vote, or instead to 
be up for public discussion and a vote. From his discussion of the Oregon physician-assisted 
suicide case, we might think Wolterstorff would go for the latter, but personal correspondence 
indicates that he believes the former. In any case, even more specificity about what is off the 
table and what is on would be good. 
 
Third, maybe things are not so bleak for public reason liberals, if they up their game and amend 
certain claims. Consider what we might call aspirational public reason liberalism. This theory is 
"aspirational" in three distinct ways. First, aspirational public reason liberalism asks citizens to 
aspire to offer reasons that are more general and broadly held than their own particular 
comprehensive-view-based reasons. But unlike the forms of liberalism that Wolterstorff's first 
argument addresses, it does not rely on the idea of a universal consensus or convergence about 
public reasons. Second, aspirational public reason liberalism does not require or demand 
 that citizens restrict themselves to these more general public reasons, but it does ask them to 
aspire to offer them. Citizens do nothing forbidden or wrongful if they articulate religious or 
other comprehensive view reasons, but they fulfill the role of citizen well if they also offer more 
general reasons -- reasons that speak to a broader swath of fellow citizens. A third aspiration 
concerns the place of these more general reasons among the citizen's individual motives: 
aspirational public reason liberalism says that these more general reasons need not be decisive 
for the citizen when she speaks and votes. We might also add a Rawlsian scope restriction: these 
aspirations apply to "most cases of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice" 
(PL, xxi), not necessarily to all matters of public discussion. 
 
I believe this form of public reason liberalism survives most of Wolterstorff's objections. It 
leaves room for many of his key points, including realism about the nature of lived citizenship 
and public activism, and also openness to religious comprehensive views as historically a fecund 
source of generalizable moral insight. It preserves many of the attractions of public reason 
liberalism as well, including an ideal of the role of citizen and the role's coercive power that 
encourages robust respect for other members of the polity. Consider Rawls's claim that "Public 
reason sees the office of citizen with its duty of civility as analogous to that of judgeship with its 
duty of deciding cases" (PL, liii). The citizen who fulfills her office well will aspire to articulate 
reasons that go beyond her personal reasons -- a good citizen will do this not, as Wolterstorff's 
equal political voice liberalism says, on a mere practical and rhetorical basis; and a good citizen 
will do this even when she is part of a repeat-winner majority, when on Wolterstorff's view there 
is no practical reason for her to do so.[1] The judge/citizen analogy may not be as tight as Rawls 
seems to think: the role of judge comes with heavy demands of neutrality, while citizens face 
less onerous aspirations. In any case, it's worth noting, as Wolterstorff does, that in the 1995 
introduction to the paperback edition of PL, Rawls does begin to soften. He says there that he 
now believes that reasons based on comprehensive doctrines "may be introduced in public reason 
at any time, provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable political 
conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are 
introduced to support" (PL, xlix). This isn't yet aspirational public reason liberalism, but it begins 
to point in that direction. 
 
Whether or not public reason liberalism can be patched up in this or other 
ways, Wolterstorff's essays certainly reveal important undigested entailments in the standard 
view. This really is an excellent book. 
 
Nearly half the book takes up other topics, and I regret that I have not managed to discuss them. 
For instance, Wolterstorff's discussion of privacy rights is particularly important. Take the case 
of J. Edgar Hoover's spying on Martin Luther King, Jr. Hoover secretly taped King's personal 
conversations and sex life. Suppose for a moment that King never knew of the privacy invasions, 
and so made no decisions in light them; suppose Hoover made the recordings for his own 
prurient enjoyment. (In fact, the FBI did try to blackmail King with these materials, as 
David Garrow's biography of King indicates. Wolterstorff notes this in one place (223), but not 
in another (326).) Standard accounts usually try to explain rights violations in terms of 
constriction of the rights holder's normative agency, or of his freedom of opinion and action. But 
in the imagined case, King's normative agency was not so affected. Still, his rights clearly were 
violated. Standard accounts of rights cannot adequately explain the wrongfulness of privacy 
violation, or the depth of the wrongness of rape, and are accordingly deficient. 
 
Another chapter concerns the nature and source of the political authority of the state -- the state's 
authority to issue binding directives to its citizens. This issue, long a mainstay in political 
philosophy, largely dropped out of discussion a few decades ago. Wolterstorff resurrects it and 
offers an interesting new account. 
 
Wolterstorff's prose and thinking are clear. The book would work well in an upper-level 
undergraduate or graduate course on liberalism.[2] 
 
 
[1]
 In personal correspondence, Wolterstorff says that he does believe that citizens are under a 
moral demand to engage others, although a failure to so engage is not a violation of the 
governing idea of liberal democracy. 
 
[2]
 My thanks to Nick Wolterstorff and Apryl Martin for their feedback on an earlier version of 
this review. 
  
--- 
 
